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1

Introduction

Environmental regulation for a polluting monopoly is an interesting case of regulation
since the market equilibrium can be ine¢ cient because two market failures are operating
at the same time but in an opposite direction. On one hand, the …rm’s market power
leads to a contraction of output and emissions below their e¢ cient levels. On the other
hand, there is a negative externality that has the opposite e¤ects. Consequently, there
will exist a level of marginal environmental damage for which the market equilibrium is
e¢ cient. Then, if marginal damages are below this threshold, a Pigouvian tax will lead
to a reduction in welfare instead of implementing the e¢ cient outcome as was shown by
Buchanan (1969). In fact, when the only way to adjust emissions is changing production,
the …rst-best emission tax must be lower than the marginal damage and even it could
be negative playing implicitly as a subsidy on production if the marginal damage is low
enough. Barnett (1980) analyzes the emission taxation of a monopolist that can operate
with an abatement technology that allows abate emissions without reducing production.
In this setting he also obtains that the tax that maximize net social welfare must be
lower than the marginal damage of emissions, but now the tax by itself cannot implement the e¢ cient outcome because a second policy instrument is needed to adjust the
level of abatement investment. Interestingly, it is easy to show using Barnett’s (1980)
model that when the …rm can operate with an abatement technology the …rst-best policy
consists of a combination of a subsidy on production and a Pigouvian tax on emissions.
The tax corrects the distortion caused by the negative externality and a subsidy equal to
the di¤erence between the price and the marginal revenue adjusts the distortion created
by the power market of the …rm. The problem with this policy is that a subsidy for
a monopoly that also implies a subsidy on dirty production can be seen from a political perspective as an alternative out of the menu of environmental policy instruments.
However, this opposition to use a subsidy on output can disappear if the subsidy is on
clean output as occurs with the feed-in subsidies for promoting renewable energy sources
(RES) deployment. A policy that has become very popular, mainly in Europe, in the
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last twenty years.1
The aim of this paper is to extend the analysis of the environmental regulation for a
polluting monopoly to take into account the possibility of using a feed-in subsidy on clean
output. The model we propose is that of a monopoly that operates with a technology
that uses a polluting input, but that can also invest in a clean technology to produce the
same good. A clear example is the production of electricity. Usually, electricity …rms
work with di¤erent technologies that use di¤erent inputs yielding an electricity-mix that
depends of the way the …rm combines the di¤erent technologies to produce the total
output.
In the …rst part of the paper, we calculate the monopoly equilibrium and characterize
the e¢ cient outcome. In both cases, the …rm will invest in the clean technology provided
that the polluting input price is not too low. However, the threshold price for the polluting
input that triggers the investment in the clean technology is lower for the e¢ cient outcome
than for the market equilibrium. Thus, there exists an interval for the input price for
which the …rm should invest in the clean technology, but it does not …nd it pro…table.
When the …rm …nds pro…table to invest in the clean technology, the monopolist’s clean
production is lower than the e¢ cient level whereas for the dirty production occurs the
contrary. As expected, the monopoly total production is lower than the e¢ cient level
yielding a larger price. In the second part of the paper, we analyze second-best policies.
The focus is on the comparison of feed-in subsidies and taxes. The target is to rank the
two policy instruments according to the level of welfare they allow to achieve. First, we
characterize the second-best emission tax. Secondly, we analyze the e¤ect that a feed-in
subsidy on the investment in a clean technology. With this aim, we solve a two-stage
1

According to a recent report of the Council of European Energy Regulators (2018) for the 2016-2017

period, 20 out of 28 Member countries of the European Union (EU) were applying this type of subsidies
including in this list France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, the main economies of the EU.
For the review period of 2016-2017, four types of instruments were mainly in place in Europe, namely:
feed-in tari¤s (FITs), feed-in premiums (FIPs), green certi…cates (GCs), and investment grants. In this
paper, we focus on the use of FIPs. An interesting paper evaluating policies to deploy RES comparing
the experience in the Unites States and the EU is Schmalensee (2012) and a paper assessing the Spanish
feed-in tari¤ at the beginning of the century is del Río and Gual (2007).

4
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policy game between the regulator and the monopolist. In the …rst stage, the regulator
chooses the level of the policy instrument to maximize net social welfare. In the second
stage, the …rm decides on the use of the clean and dirty technologies. Thus, the optimal
policy is given by the Stackelberg equilibrium of the policy game.
Our analysis shows that the Pigouvian tax is the optimal tax in a second-best setting.
The tax corrects the distortion caused by the negative externality but have no e¤ect on
total output because the long-run marginal cost of clean output is constant. The tax
implements the e¢ cient level of dirty output improving the production-mix in favour of
the clean technology. On the other hand, the feed-in subsidy increases total output and
reduces dirty output and it could implement the e¢ cient outcome, but only under special
circumstances. In general, the clean and dirty outputs could be larger or lower than the
e¢ cient levels. This leaves the comparison between the emission tax and the feed-in
subsidy undetermined, except for the total output. However, if the dirty output is higher
when a tax is applied, it is easy to check that with low enough marginal cost for the
clean output, the subsidy would yield a higher net social welfare than that obtained with
the tax. To advance in the analysis, we give more structure to the model and investigate
whether this hypothesis is true for the linear-quadratic model. In this setting, we …nd that
if the clean technology is e¢ cient enough to yield a low marginal cost, the feed-in subsidy
leads to a higher clean output and a lower dirty output than those obtained applying a
tax. Moreover, total output is larger when a feed-in subsidy is used. Finally, we …nd out
that net welfare is greater for a feed-in subsidy. With an emission tax, the increase in
welfare respect to the monopoly equilibrium comes only from the reduction in damages.
However, when a subsidy is used we have to add to the decrease in damages an increase in
the consumers’surplus along with a rise in the pro…t because the …rm sells a larger output.
These positive variations are larger than the increase in costs caused by the reduction in
the dirty output yielding a higher net welfare when the environmental policy consists of
applying a feed-in subsidy on clean output. The paper ends showing that a combination
of an emission tax and a feed-in subsidy implements the e¢ cient outcome. The optimal
subsidy is equal to the di¤erence between the price and the marginal revenue, but the
optimal tax must be lower than the marginal damage. The Pigouvian tax works with a
5
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subsidy on total output as we pointed out above, however if the subsidy only applies on
the clean output the tax has to correct not only the negative externality caused by the
dirty output, but also the distortion caused by the market power on the dirty output.
Then, the tax must be lower than the environmental marginal damage, although now the
combination of the tax and the feed-in subsidy leads to the regulated market equilibrium
to implement the e¢ cient outcome.

1.1

Literature Review

As we have just commented, the …rst characterization of the second-best emission tax
under monopoly when the …rm operates with an abatement technology is due to Barnett
(1980). He shows that the optimal tax is lower than the marginal environmental damage. However, he points out that when the tax has no e¤ect on output, the second-best
tax is the Pigouvian tax. Our model presents an example of this special case. When
the clean technology presents constant returns, the total output does not depend on the
tax and the optimal tax is equal to the marginal damage. Barnett’s (1980) analysis
of the environmental regulation of a polluting monopoly has been extended in di¤erent
directions among others by Besanko (1987), Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995), Innes
and Bial (2002), Montero (2002), Farzin (2003), Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003), Puller
(2006), Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010), Canton et al. (2008) and more recently by MonerColonques and Rubio (2016) and Martín-Herrán and Rubio (2018). In all these papers,
following Barnett’s (1980) approach, emissions depend positively on output and negatively on a variable that can stand for both the resources devoted to abatement activities
or a coe¢ cient emissions/production that can be reduced at an increasing cost for the
…rm.2 The problem with this speci…cation of the emission function is that is not suitable
for analyzing an environmental policy based on feed-in subsidies because is not possible
to discriminate between clean and dirty outputs. In fact, this literature focuses on the
2

Montero (2002), Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003), Poyago-Theotoky (2007), Canton et al. (2008),

Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2016) and Martín-Herrán and Rubio (2018) assume an end-of pipe abatement technology. For this kind of technologies, the net emissions are equal to gross emissions that are
proportional to the output minus abatement.

6
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use of taxes, di¤erent types of standards or tradable permits, but no paper addresses the
issue of subsidies on output as an instrument of the environmental policy. In this list,
we could also include the papers by Coria (2009), Gil-Moltó and Varvarigos (2013) and
Krass et al. (2013) that study the e¤ects of emission taxation on the adoption of a green
technology.
More recently, di¤erent scholars have analyzed the environmental regulation in a context of imperfect competition considering that the same good can be produced with more
than one technology and the regulator applies a feed-in subsidy to promote the use of
the clean technology. The list includes the papers by Tamás et al. (2010), Reichenbach
and Requate (2012), Sun and Nie (2015), and Fehr and Ropenus (2017).3 Tamás et
al. (2010) study the use of feed-in subsidies and tradable green certi…cates to achieve
a given quota of renewables in a oligopolistic market with clean and dirty …rms.4 Reichenbach and Requate (2012) assume that the dirty …rms form an oligopoly whereas
the clean …rms constitute a competitive fringe. Furthermore they consider an upstream
competitive industry producing renewable energy equipment engaged in learning by doing. They show that a …rst-best policy requires two instruments, a tax on dirty output
and feed-in subsidy for renewable energy equipment producers. The tax, that is lower
than the environmental damages, corrects for both the externality of pollution and the
output contraction due to oligopoly power. The subsidy corrects for insu¢ cient public
learning. They also recognize that if emissions are not proportional to output, but …rms
have a separate clean technology, a Pigouvian tax will only correct for the pollution and a
separate subsidy on dirty output would be necessary to correct for the distortion caused
by the …rms’market power. Our paper shows that with a clean technology, the e¢ cient
3

We could also mention the papers published by Requate (2015) and Antoniou and Strauz (2017),

although they assume that the polluting …rms sell their output in a competitive market.
4
In this paper and also in Reichenbach and Requate (2012) it is assumed that there are two technologies, but that the …rms use only one resulting in a market with clean and dirty …rms. Baumann and
Friehe (2017) also analyze an oligopoly with clean and dirty …rms, but they examine the consequences
of an increase in the expected …ne for non-compliance with an environmental design standard when the
number of …rms is endogenous.

7
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outcome can be also implemented without using a subsidy on dirty output. The …rst-best
policy would consist of a feed-in subsidy on the clean output and an emission tax, but as
the subsidy only applies to a part of total production, the tax should be lower than the
environmental damage to complete the corrective e¤ect of the subsidy on the distortion
created by the …rms’market power. Thus, the use of subsidies on dirty output can be
avoid using instead feed-in subsidies on clean output, but then the Pigouvian tax is not
the rule for a polluting …rm with market power.
Sun and Nie (2015) work with a model very similar to the one used in this paper,
but they focus in the numerical comparison of feed-in subsidies versus renewable portfolio
standards assuming that the policy objective of the regulator is to achieve an exogenously
given market share of the clean output. Our focus is on the comparison of feed-in subsidies
versus taxes and on the characterization of the second-best and …rst-best policies. Finally,
we could mention the paper by Fehr and Ropenus (2017) where they compare the market
equilibrium with feed-in subsidies and with green certi…cates of an industry in which a
dominant …rm producing both dirty and clean output is facing a competitive fringe of
clean …rms. They demonstrate that markets for green certi…cate allow the dominant …rm
to squeeze the margins of its competitors, but that this does not occur when a system of
feed-in subsidies is used.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, Section 2, we present the
model and characterize the market equilibrium and the e¢ cient outcome. In Section 3 we
calculate the second-best emission tax and the second-best feed-in subsidy and compare
the outcomes of the regulated market equilibrium. The comparative analysis is completed
in Section 4 using a linear-quadratic model. The …rst-best policy is characterized in
Section 5. Section 6 closes the paper with the conclusions and the presentation of di¤erent
issues for future research.

2

The Model

We consider a monopoly that faces a market demand represented by the decreasing
inverse demand function p = D(q), where q is the …rm’s output and D0 < 0. More8
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over, we assume that the marginal revenue is decreasing with the output what requires
that D00 q + 2D0 < 0: The …rm can produce the output using a dirty technology that
employs a polluting factor given by qd = f (e); where e stands for the polluting input
with f (0) = 0; f 0 > 0; lime!0 f 0 = +1 and f 00 < 0: After an appropriate choice of
measurement units we can say that each unit of input generates one unit of pollution.5
According to this technology, the production cost of the dirty output is Cd (qd ) = pe e(qd );
where pe is the input market price for the polluting input. As e0 = 1=f 0 > 0 and
e00 =

1=f 0 f 00 > 0; the marginal cost of the dirty output is zero when output is zero

and increases with the quantity.6 Pollution generates environmental damages given by
the function ED(e); ED0 > 0; ED00

0: Alternatively, the …rm can also produce the

same good investing in a clean technology that operates with constant returns qc = ak;
and costs pk : Thus, the long-run production cost of the clean technology is Cc (qc ) = qc ;
where
that

is equal to pk =a. Total output of the …rm is given by q = qc + qd and we assume
< D(0):

The market regulation is analyzed as a policy game where the …rm chooses the quantities to maximize its pro…ts and the regulator selects the policy with the aim of maximizing
net social welfare. Before studying the outcome of this game, we will characterize the
monopoly equilibrium and the e¢ cient allocation.
5

A …rst paper investigating the e¤ects of an emission tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire

a clean technology where pollution is connected explicitly with the use a production factor is Damania
(1996).
6
The analysis could be extended to consider other inputs assuming that the technology presents
decreasing returns to scale. This speci…cation of the production function could also represent a situation
where there exist di¤erent polluting technologies operating each one with a constant marginal cost.
Then, the increasing marginal cost used in the model could be seen as an approximation of the polluting
technologies. An example could be the electricity production for which di¤erent polluting inputs as coal,
fuel oil and gas can be burned for its production.

9
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2.1

The Monopoly Equilibrium

First, we analyze the short-run decision on output. In the short run, the maximization
problem faced by the monopolist is the following:
max

= D(q)q

fqc ;qd g

pk k

s:t: q = qc + qd ; qc

pe e(qd );
ak:

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the problem are
@L
= D0 (q)q + D(q)
@qc
@L
= D0 (q)q + D(q)
@qd
@L
= ak qc 0;
@

0; qc

0; qc

@L
= 0;
@qc
@L
0; qd
= 0;
@qc

pe e0 (qd )

0; qd

0;

qc ) = 0:

(ak

(1)
(2)
(3)

As the short-run marginal cost (SMC) of the clean technology is zero, if the marginal
revenue is zero for a positive quantity, q^; the …rm could produce all output only with
the clean technology provided that the installed capacity allows to the …rm produces a
quantity equal to or higher than q^: Then, the multiplier should be zero since it must
satis…ed that
= D0 (ak)ak + D(ak)

pe e0 (0) = 0 and

0:

Instead suppose that the …rm uses both technologies what implies that qc = ak and
D0 (ak + qd )(ak + qd ) + D(ak + qd )

pe e0 (qd ) = 0;

(4)

which implicitly de…nes the function qd (k): According to Implicit Function Theorem, the
slope of this function is
dqd
=
dk

a(D00 q + 2D0 )
< 0;
D00 q + 2D0 pe e00

(5)

because we have assumed that the marginal revenue is decreasing. Then, the impact of
a change in k on total output will be
dq
dqc dqd
=
+
=a
dk
dk
dk

a(D00 q + 2D0 )
ape e00
=
> 0:
D00 q + 2D0 pe e00
D00 q + 2D0 pe e00

(6)

10
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Next, we analyze the long-run decision on investment in the clean technology. The
…rm will choose the level of capital that maximizes its pro…ts taking into account the
e¤ect that the decision has on output
max
fkg

= D(ak + qd (k))(ak + q(k))

pk k

pe e(qd (k)):

pk

pe e0 (qd (k))

The Kuhn-Tucker condition of this problem is
dqd
@
= (D0 (q(k))q(k) + D(q(k))) a +
@k
dk
k

0; k

dqd
dk

0;

@
= 0;
@k

that according to condition (4) results in
@
= (D0 (q(k))q(k) + D(q(k)))a
@k

pk

0; k

0; k

@
= 0:
@k

Let’s suppose that there is a complete substitution of the dirty technology by the clean
one. Then,
pk
= = > 0;
a
= 0 when this occurs: Thus, although the

D0 (ak)ak + D(ak) =
what contradicts our previous result that

SMC of the clean output is zero, the long-run marginal cost (LMC) is positive and the …rm
will not use only the clean technology. If the …rm uses both technologies, the following
condition must be satis…ed
D0 (q)q + D(q) =

= pe e0 (qd );

(7)

that establishes the well known condition that the marginal costs must be equal. However,
as the marginal cost of dirty output decreases with the polluting input price, there will
exist a threshold for this price de…ned by condition
D0 (qd )qd + D(qd ) =
such that is pe

= pe e0 (qd );

(8)

pe the …rm will not invest in the clean technology. Notice that if the

price is low enough, the condition D0 (qd )qd + D(qd ) = pe e0 (qd ) will be hold for a marginal
cost of the dirty output lower than : Then, all the output is produced with the dirty
technology. These results can be summarized in the following proposition
11
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Proposition 1 The …rm will not invest in the clean technology if the polluting input
price, pe ; is lower or equal to the threshold value, pe ; de…ned by condition (8). If pe < pe ;
the investment is positive, but the …rm does not pro…table to substitute completely the
dirty technology.
If we assume that pe < pe ; condition (7) de…nes implicitly the total output for
the monopoly as a function of

; q m ( ); and the dirty output as a function of

and

pe ; qdm ( ; pe ):7 Using again the Implicit Function Theorem we obtain the slopes of these
functions8
dq m
1
1
@qdm
@qdm
= 00
=
=
<
0;
>
0;
d
D q + 2D0
@
pe e00
@pe

e0
< 0;
pe e00

that allows us to conclude that
dq m
@qcm
=
@
d

@qdm
@qcm
< 0;
=
@
@pe

@qdm
> 0:
@pe

Thus, an increase in the LMC of the clean output reduces the clean output and increases
the dirty output with a negative net e¤ect on total output. On the other hand, an
increase in the price of the polluting output reduces the dirty output and increases the
clean output, but leaves unchanged the total output.
Moreover, using these expressions we can obtain the production-mix used by the …rm
de…ned as the ratio between dirty and total output
q~m =

qdm ( ; pe )
:
qm( )

(9)

From the previous results it is immediate that
@ q~m
@ q~m
> 0;
< 0:
@
@pe
An increase in the LMC of the clean output increases the weight that dirty output has
on total output whereas an increase in the input price has the contrary e¤ect.
7
8

The superscript m represents the outcome of the monopoly equilibrium.
Notice that as the …rm operates at full capacity, an increase in the price of the polluting input will

increase the price of the monopoly in the short-run. Thus, the e¤ects we obtain applying the implicit
function theorem are the long-run e¤ects that take into account the adjustment in the capacity of the
clean technology.

12
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2.2

The E¢ cient Outcome

The e¢ cient outcome is given by the quantities that maximize net social welfare de…ned
as the sum of consumers’surplus plus producer surplus minus environmental damages9
Z q
D(y)dy
qc pe e(qd ) ED(e(qd )):
max N SW =
fqc ;qd g

0

The solution to this optimization problem must satisfy the following condition for an
interior solution:
D(q) =

= (pe + ED0 (e(qd )))e0 (qd ):

(10)

where the last term stands for the full marginal cost of the dirty output, that includes
the marginal cost of production plus the marginal environmental damages caused by the
production of the good with the dirty technology. The e¢ ciency requires that the price
be equal to the marginal costs and hence that the marginal cost of the clean production
be equal to the full marginal cost of the dirty production. As occurs for the market
equilibrium, there also exists a threshold for the price of the polluting input de…ned by
the condition D(qd ) =

= (pe + ED0 (e(qd )))e0 (qd ); such that if pe

pe it is not e¢ cient

to invest in the clean technology.10 It is easy to show using conditions (7) and (10) that
m
pe is lower than pm
e what implies that if pe belongs to the the interval ( pe ; pe ] the …rm

should invest in the clean technology, but it does not.
Condition (10) implicitly de…nes the quantities that maximize net social welfare,
q ( ) and qd ( ; pe ); and hence qc ( ; pe ) = q ( )

qd ( ; pe ): Comparing the prices for

the monopoly equilibrium and the e¢ cient outcome assuming that pe is higher than
pm
e ; D(q )

D(q m ) = D0 (q m )q m < 0; we obtain the standard result that establishes that

the monopoly total output is lower than the e¢ cient level of total output.
On the other hand, we have that ED0 (e(qd ))e0 (qd ) = pe (e0 (qdm )

e0 (qd )) > 0; and we

can conclude that the monopoly dirty output is larger than the e¢ cient level of dirty
output since the marginal cost of the dirty output is an increasing function. Then, as
9

In the rest of the paper we focus on the study of the long-run decisions of the …rm and state the

optimization problems in terms of the clean and dirty output using the long-run production cost of the
clean technology.
10
The superscript

is used to represent the e¢ cient solution.

13
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the e¢ cient total output is larger than the monopoly total output and the e¢ cient dirty
output is lower, the monopoly clean output is lower than the e¢ cient level of clean output.
Consequently
q~m =

qdm
q
> q~ = d :
m
q
q

The distortions caused by the market power of the …rm and the negative externality lead
to a production-mix that gives more weight to the dirty output. On one hand, as the
…rm does not take into account the negative externality of its dirty output, this is above
the e¢ cient level. On the other hand, the market power yields a lower level of total
output. Thus, the combination of these two distortion yield a monopoly production-mix
that is larger than the e¢ cient production-mix. The following proposition summarizes
the results obtained for this comparison:
Proposition 2 The monopolist’s clean production is lower than the e¢ cient level whereas
for the dirty production occurs the contrary so that the monopolist’s production-mix is
higher than the e¢ cient level. As expected, the monopoly total production is lower than
the e¢ cient level yielding a higher price. Moreover, there exists an interval of prices for
the polluting input for which the …rm should invest in the clean technology, but it does
not …nd it pro…table.

3

Emission Taxes versus Feed-in Subsidies

In this section, we study the second-best policy considering two alternative policy instruments: a tax on emissions and a feed-in subsidy on the clean output. For characterizing
the optimal policy, we calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium of a policy game where the
regulator acts as the leader of the game. Thus, in the …rst stage, the regulator selects
the level of the policy instrument with the aim of maximizing the net social welfare, and
in the second stage, the …rm chooses the levels of clean and dirty output. We will begin
with the analysis of the emission tax.

14
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3.1

The Emission Tax

Solving by backward induction, we solve …rst the second stage. At this stage, the monopolist, given the level of the tax selected by the regulator in the …rst stage, chooses the
quantities that maximize its pro…ts
max

fqc ;qd g

t

= D(qc + qd )(qc + qd )

qc

(pe + t)e(qd ) + S;

where S stands for a lump-sum subsidy that we assume equal to the tax revenues.11 In
this way, the environmental policy is neutral from a …scal point of view, i.e. it does not
a¤ect the public de…cit/surplus. The aim of the regulator is not to collect money, but to
reduce emissions.
The FOCs of the problem yield
D0 (q)q + D(q) =

= (pe + t)e0 (qd ):

(11)

It is straightforward that total production of the monopoly does not change with the
application of the tax, but the tax modify the production-mix. The RHS of this condition
de…nes the reaction function qd (t) that has negative slope
e0
< 0;
(pe + t)e00

(12)

that for a constant total output implies that dqc =dt =

dqd =dt: Although the absolute

dqd
=
dt

values of the slope are the same, we …nd that the clean output is a strategic complement
of the tax whereas the dirty output is a strategic substitute. A variation in the tax a¤ects
the production-mix, but it has no e¤ects on the total output and price.
Next, we solve the …rst stage. Substituting qc (t) and qd (t) in the net social welfare,
we obtain an expression that depends on t
Z q
D(y)dy
qc (t)
max N SW =
ftg

pe e(qd (t))

ED(e(qd (t))):

0

As the tax does not a¤ect total output, the regulator’s optimization problem can be
rewritten as follows
min f qc (t) + pe e(qd (t)) + ED(e(qd (t)))g :
ftg

11

The superscript t stands for the outcome of the market equilibrium when a tax is applied by the

regulator.
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The FOC for this problem is
dqd
dqc
+ (pe + ED0 )e0
= 0;
dt
dt
as dqc =dt =

dqd =dt, the previous condition yields the e¢ cient condition (pe +ED0 )e0 =

that taking into account (11) yields
(pe + ED0 )e0 =

= (pe + t)e0 ;

what implies that t = ED0 (e ): Thus, the second-best emission tax is the Pigouvian tax
and the monopolist implements the e¢ cient level of dirty production, qdt = qd < qdm but
the total output is lower, q t = q m < q what implies that qcm < qct < qc : Then, we have
that
q~m =

qdm
qd
qd
t
>
q
~
=
>
q
~
=
:
qm
qm
q

Thus, the optimal tax induces the …rm to produce the e¢ cient level of emissions,
but it does not a¤ect the total output. The result is that the clean output is larger
than the level achieved by the monopoly when there is no regulation but lower than the
e¢ cient level and consequently the same occurs for the production-mix. Next proposition
summarizes these results.
Proposition 3 The second-best tax rate is the Pigouvian tax. The tax induces the monopolist to implement the e¢ cient level of the dirty output but does not modify the total
output. The result is that although the monopolist increases the clean output and reduces
the production-mix, the e¢ cient level of the clean output is not achieved.
As the tax is equal to the marginal damage of emissions, the new marginal cost curve
corresponds to the full marginal cost and the monopolist chooses the e¢ cient level of the
dirty output, but the tax does not a¤ect the equilibrium point de…ned by the marginal
cost of the clean technology, : The consequence is that the total output is not a¤ected by
the emission tax. Thus, we could say that the tax only corrects the distortion causes the
negative externality changing the composition of the total output, but does not a¤ect the
…rm’s market power. The price charged to the consumers continues being the monopoly
price.
16
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3.2

The Feed-in Subsidy

If the …rm faces a feed-in subsidy, the optimization problem that yields the quantities in
the second stage is

max

fqc ;qd g

s

= D(qc + qd )(qc + qd )

(

s)qc

pe e(qd )

T;

where s is the subsidy per unit of clean output and T stands for a lump-sum tax that we
assume equal to the total subsidy.12 Again, the idea is to de…ne an environmental policy
that is neutral from a …scal point of view.
The FOCs of the problem yield the following condition
D0 (q)q + D(q) =

s = pe e0 (qd ):

(13)

The reaction functions de…ne by these conditions, q(s) and qd (s); have the following slopes
dq
=
ds

D00 q

1
dqd
> 0;
=
0
+ 2D
ds

1
< 0;
pe e00

(14)

resulting in a dqc =ds that is positive.
The clean output is a strategic complement of the policy instrument whereas the dirty
output is a strategic substitute. Thus, the subsidy decreases the production-mix, however,
now the e¤ect on total output is positive and the feed-in subsidy will cause a reduction
in the price.
Next, we solve the …rst stage. Taking into account the reaction functions qc (s) and
qd (c); the net social welfare is a function of s
Z q(s)
max N SW =
D(y)dy
qc (s)
fsg

pe e(qd (s))

ED(e(qd (s))):

0

The maximization with respect to the subsidy gives the following condition
(D

)

dq
+(
ds

(pe + ED0 )e0 )

dqd
= 0:
ds

(15)

This condition establishes that the variation in net social welfare caused by the increase
in total output that is given by the di¤erence between the price and the marginal cost
12

The superscript s stands for the outcome of the market equilibrium when a feed-in subsidy is applied

by the regulator.
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of clean output must compensate the variation in net social welfare coming from the
reduction in dirty output that depends on the di¤erence in the marginal cost of both
technologies taking into account the environmental damages in the case of the dirty
production.
Using the FOCs for the maximization of pro…ts, this condition can be rewritten as
follows
(s + D0 q)

dq
+ (s
ds

ED0 e0 )

dqd
= 0;
ds

that allows us to obtain an expression for the subsidy
s =

D0 (q)q dq
ds

dqd
ED0 e0
ds

dqc
ds

=

p dq
j j ds

d
ED0 e0 dq
ds

dqc
ds

> 0;

(16)

where j j stands for the price-elasticity of demand function. The subsidy presents two
components. The …rst one re‡ects the distortion caused by the market power of the
…rm and is inversely related to the price-elasticity of the demand function. The second
component depends on the environmental damages and appears in the expression because
of the distortion caused by the negative externality.
Notice that if the e¢ cient conditions are satis…ed, the FOC (15) also holds and the
subsidy could implement the e¢ cient outcome, but then the e¢ cient outcome should
satisfy that ED0 (e )e0 (qd ) = s =

D0 (q )q : In general, this condition will not hold

and that the optimal subsidy given by (16) will not implement the e¢ cient outcome.
Then, we could have two types of solutions: one when D
pe e0

> 0 what implies that

ED0 e0 > 0 and the other when the contrary occurs. When D(q s ) >

as

= D(q ) for the e¢ cient output, we can conclude that q s is lower than q :13 On
the other hand, as then

> (pe + ED0 )e0 and for the e¢ cient outcome we have that

= (pe + ED0 )e0 ; qds is lower than the qd since the full marginal cost is increasing with
respect to the dirty output. However, these comparisons do not allow us to get a clear sign
for the comparison of the clean output and hence for the comparison of the productionmix. When D

< 0 and

pe e0

ED0 e0 > 0, we obtain that q s is larger than q and

that qds is also larger than qd ; but again the comparison of the levels of the clean output
and production-mix remains undetermined.
13

Where the supersript s stands for the equilibrium when a subsidy is applied by the regulator.
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Next, we compare the outputs supported by the subsidy with the monopoly outputs.
From the FOCs (7) and (13), we obtain that the di¤erence in the marginal revenues is
equal to the subsidy
D(q m ) + D0 (q m )q m

(D0 (q s )q s + D(q s )) = s > 0:

As we assume that the marginal revenue is decreasing and we have shown that the subsidy
is positive, we obtain that q m is lower than q s : Moreover, these conditions also establish
that the subsidy must be equal to the di¤erence in the marginal cost of the dirty output
s = pe (e0 (qdm )

e0 (qds )) > 0;

which allows us to conclude that qds is lower than qdm since the marginal cost is increasing.
Then, the qcm must be lower than qcs and q~s must be also lower than q~s : Next proposition
summarizes these comparisons.
Proposition 4 The optimal subsidy leads the monopolist to reduce the dirty output and
increase the total output resulting in a higher level of clean output and a lower level of
the production-mix. However, the dirty and total outputs could be larger or lower than
the e¢ cient levels and the same occurs for the clean output.
Finally, we compare the outputs resulting from the application of the second-best
policies. From Props. 3 and 4, we know that the total output is not a¤ected by the tax,
whereas the subsidy increases the total output so that we can conclude that q t is lower
than q s : However, as qds can be higher or lower than qd we cannot establish whether qdt is
higher or lower than qds : When qdt is higher than qds ; it is straightforward that qct is lower
than qcs and that the production-mix is higher when a tax is applied. This ambiguity
in the comparison between the dirty output corresponding to the di¤erent policies does
di¢ cult to rank them in terms of net social welfare. However, when qdt is higher than qds ;
that can be a plausible result, it is easy to check that if the productivity of the capital
invested in the clean technology is high enough the subsidy will yield a higher net social
welfare. Writing the di¤erence in net social welfare as follows
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N SW (t)

N SW (s) =
Z

Z

qt

D(y)dy

qct

pe e(qdt )

ED(e(qdt ))

0

qs

D(y)dy

qcs

pe e(qds )

ED(e(qds ))

0

=

Z

0

qt

D(y)dy

Z

qs

D(y)dy + (qcs

qct ) + pe (e(qds )

e(qdt )) + ED(e(qds ))

ED(e(qdt ));

0

we have that all terms are negative when qdt > qds and q s > q t except the second one that
is positive because qcs > qct , but this component depends on

the marginal cost of the

clean technology. For this reason, we expect a positive value for this expression when
is low enough. In the next section, we give more structure to our model and investigate
whether this hypothesis is satis…ed.

4

The Linear-quadratic Case

In this section we consider a monopoly that faces a market demand represented by a
linear demand function p = A

q, where q is the …rm’s output. The …rm can produce

the output using a dirty technology that employs a polluting factor given by qd = ad e1=2 ;
where e stands for the polluting input and ad is a positive parameter measuring factor
productivity. After an appropriate choice of measurement units we can say that each unit
of input generates one unit of pollution. According to this technology, the production
cost of the dirty output is Cd (qd ) = (pe = )qd2 ; where pe is the input market price and
= a2d : Pollution generates environmental damages given by the function D(e) = de; d >
0: Alternatively, the …rm can also produce the same good using a clean technology that
operates with constant returns qc = ac k; and can be bought at a cost equal to pk : Thus,
the production cost of the clean technology is Cc (qc ) = qc ; where

is given by pk =ac .

Total output of the …rm is given by q = qc + qd and we assume that

< A:14

14

Our speci…cation gives the same cost structure for the polluting …rms that the one used by Fischer

et al. (2018) in their analysis of the subsidies with renewable energy standards, although in their model
the market for the polluting …rms is competitive.
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For this speci…cation of the model the monopoly equilibrium quantities for the clean
and dirty outputs are given by the following expressions
qcm =

(A

)pe
2pe

so that the total output is q m = (A

; qdm =

2pe

(17)

;

)=2: The …rst expression in (17) clearly establishes

that the …rm will only produce a clean output if the price of the polluting input is not
too low. In particular if
pe > pm
e =

(18)

;

A

as was established in Section 2.1. Moreover, using the quantities in (17) we can obtain
the production-mix used by the …rm de…ned as the ratio between dirty and total output
q~m =

qdm
=
qm
(A

(19)

:

)pe

For these quantities, the net social welfare and pro…ts are
N SW m =

)2 p2e + 2
8p2e

3(A

2

(pe

d)

m

;

=

) 2 pe +
4pe

(A

2

:

(20)

On the other hand, the quantities that maximize net social welfare are
qc =

2(A

)(d + pe )
2(pe + d)

qd =

2(pe + d)

Adding these quantities, we obtain the total output, q = A

(21)

:

: Notice that to have a

positive clean production a high enough price is also needed. However, it is easy to check
that if condition (18) holds, the e¢ cient level of the clean output is also positive because
pm
e > pe . The production-mix corresponding to the e¢ cient outcome is
q~ =

4.1

2(A

)(d + pe )

(22)

:

The Emission Tax

When a tax is used to control emissions, the tax rate that maximizes the net social welfare
is: t = d; and the clean and dirty outputs are

qct =

(A

)(d + pe )
2(d + pe )

; qdt = q =

2(d + pe )

;

(23)
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where the clean output is positive if the condition (18) is satis…ed. These two quantities
gives the following production-mix
q~t =

(A

(24)

:

)(d + pe )

Fig. 1 graphically illustrates the e¤ects of the Pigouvian tax on the monopoly equilibrium.
) FIG. 1 (
In the …gure, we see that the tax increases the marginal cost of the dirty output.
As the tax is equal to the marginal damage of emissions, the new marginal cost curve
corresponds to the full marginal cost and the monopolist chooses the e¢ cient level of the
dirty output, but the tax does not a¤ect the equilibrium point de…ned by the marginal
cost of the clean technology, M Cc = : The result is that the total output is not a¤ected
by the emission tax. Thus, we could say that the tax only corrects the distortion causes
the negative externality changing the composition of the total output, but does not a¤ect
the …rm’s market power.
Finally, we calculate the players’payo¤s
N SW t =

)2

3(A
8

2

+

4(pe + d)

;

t

=

)2

(A
4

2

+

4(pe + d)

:

(25)

Usually, a second-best policy improves welfare with respect to the market equilibrium
without regulation, but we want to check this point for our model. Comparing the payo¤s
presenting above with those obtained for the monopoly equilibrium without regulation
we obtain the following signs
2 2

N SW t

d
> 0;
4(pe + d)p2e
2 2
d
=
< 0;
4(pe + d)2 pe

N SW m =
t

m

and the conclusion is that
Proposition 5 The Pigouvian tax is welfare improving, although it reduces the monopolist’s pro…t.
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In Fig. 1, the area B represents the increase in the production cost because of the
reduction in the dirty output. This causes the decrease in the monopoly pro…t. On the
other hand, the area B + E re‡ects the reduction in damages. Consequently the area E
stands for the welfare gains.

4.2

The Feed-in Subsidy

When a subsidy is applied to regulate the monopoly emissions, the subsidy that maximizes
net social welfare is
s=

(A
)p2e + 2 d
:
p2e + 2 (d + pe )

The subsidy is positive but the net marginal cost of the clean technology,

(26)
s; could be

negative
s=

(2
p2e

(A 2 )pe )pe
:
+ 2 (d + pe )

This expression says us that if the marginal cost of the clean technology is high enough,
in particular, if

A=2; the net subsidy cannot be negative. However, in this paper we

are interested in the contrary case, in a clean technology that is e¢ cient enough to yield
a low marginal cost and consequently a large market size for the output. For this reason,
we assume from now that

< A=2 and that the price of the polluting input is not too

high
2
> pe :
A 2

(27)

Notice that this upper bound is compatible with the lower bound de…ned by (18). Moreover, if this condition is satis…ed we can conclude that
@s
2 pe (2
(A 2 )pe )
=
> 0:
2
@d
(pe + 2 (d + pe ))2
An increase in the marginal damages brings an augmentation in the subsidy.15 For a
feed-in subsidy, the clean and dirty outputs are
qcs =
15

2( + pe )((A
)pe
) + A(2d + pe )
(2
(A 2 )pe )
s
;
q
=
:
d
2(p2e + 2 (d + pe ))
2(p2e + 2 (d + pe ))

(28)

For the rest of parameters, the e¤ect is ambiguous.
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Adding these two quantities the total output is obtained
qs =

pe ((A

)pe
) + A(pe + d)
:
2
pe + 2 (pe + d)

(29)

The clean output is positive if condition (18) holds whereas the dirty output is positive
if condition (27) is satis…ed. With a positive net marginal cost of the clean technology
we expect a positive dirty output because the marginal costs of both technologies must
be the same in the equilibrium. Thus, we assume that the price of the polluting input is
large enough to guarantee that the clean output is positive for all the cases studied in the
paper, but not to high in order to guarantee a positive dirty output when the regulator
applies a feed-in subsidy.16
The quantities in (28) also allow us to calculate the production-mix
q~s =

(2
2( + pe )((A

(A
)pe

2 )pe )
:
) + A(2d + pe )

(30)

Finally, we calculate the net social welfare and the …rm’s pro…ts.
N SW s =
s

=

Ape )2
A(3A 4 ) (2( + pe )
+
;
8
8(p2e + 2 (pe + d))

A2 (2( + pe )
Ape )2 (pe + d)pe
+
4
4(p2e + 2 (pe + d))2

A(2( + pe )
Ape )pe
:
2
2(pe + 2 (pe + d))

(31)

(32)

Once calculated the quantities induced by the application of the feed-in subsidy, it
is interesting to compare them with those obtained for the monopoly equilibrium and
e¢ cient solution. The di¤erences with respect to the monopoly equilibrium outputs are
given by the following expressions:

16

(pe + ) ((A
)p2e + 2d )
> 0;
2pe (p2e + 2 (pe + d))
((A
)p2e + 2 d)
=
< 0;
2pe (p2e + 2 (pe + d))
(A
)p2e + 2 d
=
> 0:
2(p2e + 2 (pe + d))

qcs

qcm =

qds

qdm

qs

qm

For a polluting input price higher than the upper bound de…ned by (27), the model gives a corner

solution with qds = 0: In this paper, we focus on the interior solution assuming the polluting input price
is not so high as to yield a complete substitution of the dirty technology by the clean technology.
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As was established in Prop. 3, the feed-in subsidy decreases the dirty output but increases
the clean output for a larger quantity resulting in an increase of the total output. As the
dirty output decreases and the contrary occurs for the clean output, the production-mix
decreases.
The comparison with the e¢ cient quantities yields

q~s

q~ =

qcs

qc =

qds

qd =

qs

q

=

(2d + pe ) ((A
)pe + (A 2 )d)
< 0;
2(p2e + 2 (d + pe ))(d + pe )
pe ((A
)pe + (A 2 )d)
< 0;
2(p2e + 2 (d + pe ))(d + pe )
((A
)pe + (A 2 )d)
< 0;
2
pe + 2 (d + pe )

2 ((A
)p
) ((A 2 )d + (A
(2( + pe )((A
)pe
) + A(2d + pe ))(2(A

)p)
)(d + pe )

)

< 0:

The following proposition summarizes these results and Fig. 2 shows them
Proposition 6 The optimal feed-in subsidy given by (26) leads to the monopolist to
increase the clean output and to reduce the dirty output resulting in an increase of the
production-mix and total output. However, if

A=2 all the outputs are bellow the

e¢ cient levels and the same occurs for the production-mix.17

) FIG. 2 (
In the graph, the reduction in the marginal cost caused by the subsidy increases the …rm’s
total output from q m to q s ; but it does not reach the e¢ cient level given by q : On the
other hand, the dirty output decreases until qds ; a level that is bellow the e¢ cient dirty
output level. The distance between q s and qds that represents the clean output is clearly
lower than the distance between q and qd :
Next, we evaluate the e¤ect that the subsidy has on the players’payo¤s
N SW

s

N SW
s

17

If

m

m

((A
)p2e + 2 d)2
=
> 0;
8p2e (p2e + 2 (pe + d))
(pe + )((A
)p2e + 2 d)2
=
< 0;
4pe (p2e + 2 (pe + d))2

> A=2 the dirty and clean outputs could be larger or lower than the e¢ cient levels and the same

occurs for the total output as was established in Prop. 4.
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so that we can conclude that
Proposition 7 A feed-in subsidy is welfare improving, although it reduces the monopolist’s pro…ts.
In Fig. 2, the area B + F + G + K + L represents the increase in the production cost.
B + F + G is the increase in costs because qdm

qds is produced at a higher cost whereas

the increase in costs given by K + L is the result of expanding the output. On the other
hand, as the total output increases, the revenues increase by the area J + K + L but
decreases by the area H: Thus, J

H

B

F

G stands for the drop in pro…t. Moreover,

damages decrease by the areas B + E + G and the net consumers’surplus increases by
the area H + I: The net e¤ect is an increase in the net social welfare equal to the area
I +J

4.3

F + E:

Comparing the outcome of both policies

The analysis developed in the previous sections establishes that the two policy instruments
are welfare improving. In this section, we compare them with the aim of …nding out if
one of them yields a larger welfare than the other. We begin this comparative analysis,
comparing the outputs
qct

qcs =

qdt

qds =

qt

qs =

)( + pe + d)p2e + (Ape + 2 d) d
< 0;
2(p2e + 2 (pe + d))(pe + d)
pe ((A
)pe + (A 2 )d)
> 0;
2(pe + d)(p2e + 2 (pe + d))
(A
)p2e + 2 d
< 0:
2(p2e + 2 (pe + d))
(A

As the subsidy gives a higher level of the clean output and a lower level of the dirty
output, the production-mix is higher when a tax is applied that when a subsidy is used
to promote the use of the clean technology. The next proposition summarizes these results
and Fig. 2 shows these relationships
Proposition 8 The feed-in subsidy yields a higher clean output and a higher total output
resulting in a lower production-mix. Moreover, if

A=2 the dirty output is lower when

a subsidy is applied to promote clean output.
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The tax yields a higher level of the dirty output but a lower level of the total output,
the result is that the distance representing the clean output for the tax is lower than the
distance representing the clean output for the feed-in subsidy.
Next, we compare the net social welfare and the pro…ts of the …rm18
N SW t

N SW s =
t

s

=

3 ) + dpe (A
)(4 + (A
)pe ) + p3e (A
8(p2e + 2 (pe + d))(pe + d)
2 2
d
(pe + )((A
)p2e + 2 d)2
+
> 0:
4(pe + d)2 pe
4pe (p2e + 2 (pe + d))2

2

d2 (2A

)2

< 0;

Proposition 9 A feed-in subsidy leads to a larger net social welfare but to lower pro…ts
for the …rm provided that

A=2.

We can compare graphically the players’ payo¤s using the Fig. 2. In this …gure,
the area B stands for the reduction in the …rm’s pro…ts when a tax is applied whereas
the area H

J + B + F + G represents the reduction in pro…ts when a feed-subsidy is

used to promote the clean technology. Our analysis establishes that H

J + F + G is

positive what means that the feed-subsidy causes a reduction in the …rm’s pro…t higher
than that originated by the tax. With a subsidy the production cost increases more that
with a tax and there is also a variation in the pro…t given by the area H

J because the

increase in the total output. On the other hand, the area E represents the increase in
net social welfare for a tax, and the area I + J

F + E the increase in net social welfare

when a feed-subsidy is used. The last proposition says us that I + J

F is positive.

The subsidy yields an increase in net social welfare larger than that provoked by the tax.
With a tax, the increase in welfare comes only from the reduction in damages. Instead,
for a subsidy we have to add to the reduction in damages an increase in the consumers’
surplus represented by the area I along with an increase in the pro…t given by the area J
because the …rm sells a larger quantity of the commodity. These positive variations are
larger than the increase in costs that is is not compensated by the reduction in damages
represented by the area F that is caused by the reduction in the dirty output.
18

The sign in the di¤erence in pro…ts is determined in the Appendix.
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5

Emissions Taxes with Feed-in Subsidies

In this last section, we characterize the optimal policy when the regulator uses the two
policy instruments studied above. When this occurs, the maximization of net pro…ts is
given by the following expression:
max

fqc ;qd g

= D(qc + qd )(qc + qd )

(

s)qc

(pe + t)e(qd ) + M;

where M is a lump-sum transfer that we assume equal to the di¤erence T S = te(qd ) sqc :
Solving …rst the second stage, we calculate …rst the FOCs for the maximization of
pro…ts

@
= D0 (q)q + D(q)
@qc
@
= D0 (q)q + D(q)
@qd

(33)

+ s = 0;
(pe + t)e0 (qd ) = 0:

(34)

From these conditions we obtain that the dirty output is given by the following expression
s = (pe + t)e0 (qd ) that implicitly de…nes the monopolist’s reaction function for the
dirty output: qd (s; t): It is easy to check that the slopes of the reaction function are
negative
@qd
=
@s

1
@qd
< 0;
=
00
(pe + t)e
@t

e0
< 0;
(pe + t)e00

and we can conclude that the dirty output is a strategic substitute of both the subsidy and
the tax as occurs when only a policy instrument is used. In fact, @qd =@t coincides with
(12). On the other hand, condition (33) establishes that the total output only depends
on the subsidy as occurs in Subsection 3.2. Finally, the reaction function for the dirty
output can be calculated as the di¤erence between the total output and the dirty output:
qc (s; t) = q(s)

qd (s; t); so that the slopes are
@qc
dq
=
@s
ds

@qd
=
@s

D00 q

1
1
+
> 0;
0
+ 2D
(pe + t)e00

where the …rst derivative is given by (14), and @qc =@t =

@qd =@t > 0: Again, as occurs

when only a policy instrument is used, the clean output is a strategic complement of both
the the subsidy and the tax.
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Next, we move to the …rst stage. Substituting qc (s; t) and qd (s; t) in the net social
welfare, we obtain an expression that depends on the policy instruments
Z q(s)
D(y)dy
qc (s; t) pe e(qd (s; t)) ED(e(qd (s; t)))
max N SW =
fs;tg

=

0

Z

q(s)

D(y)dy

q(s) + qd (s; t)

pe e(qd (s; t))

ED(e(qd (s; t))):

0

The FOCs for this problem are
@N SW
@s
@N SW
@t

= (D

)

dq
+(
ds

(pe + ED0 )e0 )

(pe + ED0 )e0 )

= (

@qd
= 0;
@s

@qd
= 0:
@t

(36)

If the FOCs that characterize the e¢ cient outcome are satis…ed, then D(q ) =
yields that s =

(35)

and (33)

D(q )q : The optimal feed-in subsidy is equal to the di¤erence between

the price and the marginal revenue. Moreover, taking into account that D(q ) =

;

condition (34) can be written as follows
=

D0 (q )q + (pe + t )e0 (qd );

that along with condition (36) yields
D0 (q )q + (pe + t )e0 (qd ) = (pe + ED0 (e ))e0 (qd );
that allows us to obtain the following expression for the optimal tax
t = ED0 (e ) +

D0 (q )q
= ED0 (e )
e0 (qd )

p
j

1
j e0 (qd )

;

(37)

where j j is the price-elasticity of demand. Thus, we can conclude that
Proposition 10 The e¢ cient solution can be implemented through the market mechanism using two policy instruments: a emission tax on emissions lower than the environmental damages and a feed-in subsidy equal to the di¤erence between the price and the
marginal revenue.
The optimal tax is lower than the environmental damage because the feed-in subsidy
only applies to the clean output. With a subsidy on total output condition (34) would
be
@
= D0 (q)q + D(q)
@qd

(pe + t)e0 (qd ) + s = 0;
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and then the level of the dirty output selected by the monopolist would not depend on
the subsidy and the optimal tax would be the Pigouvian tax. The tax would correct the
market distortion caused by the pollution and the subsidy the market distortion caused
by the …rm’s market power. However, if the subsidy applies only to the clean output, the
tax has to correct not only the negative externality caused by the dirty output, but also
the distortion originated by the market power on the dirty output. Then the tax must be
lower than the environmental damage, but now as the tax is applied along with a subsidy
on clean output, the result is that the e¢ cient outcome is implemented by the regulated
market equilibrium. Thus, if the subsidy can be only used to promote the clean output,
the …rst-best tax is not anymore the Pigouvian tax as occurs when the subsidy is applied
on total output.

6

Conclusions

This paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of
a polluting monopoly. We study a monopoly that can produce the same good with a
technology that employs a polluting input and an alternative clean technology. In the
…rst part of the paper, we characterize the market equilibrium and the e¢ cient outcome
and highlight the important role that the input price has on the investment in the clean
technology. In the second part, we calculate the second-best tax and subsidy solving
a two-stage policy game between the regulator and the monopolist with the regulator
acting as the leader of the game. We …nd that the second-best tax rate is the Pigouvian
tax. The tax induces the monopolist to implement the e¢ cient level of the dirty output
but does not modify the total output. Consequently, the e¢ cient level of the clean output
is not achieved. On the other hand, the optimal subsidy leads the monopolist to reduce
the dirty output and increase the total output resulting in a higher level of clean output.
However, the dirty and total outputs could be larger or lower than the e¢ cient levels
and the same occurs for the clean output. This leaves the comparison between the two
equilibria of the policy game undetermined, except for the total output. Nevertheless, if
the dirty output is higher when a tax is applied the feed-in subsidy would yield a higher
30
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net social welfare provided that the marginal cost of the clean output is not very high.
We con…rm this hypothesis for a linear-quadratic model. The subsidy leads to a larger
net social welfare because it increases total output whereas the tax leaves the total output
unaltered. Finally, we …nd that the combination of an emission tax with a feed-in subsidy
induces the …rm to choose the e¢ cient outputs, but the …rst-best tax must be lower than
the Pigouvian tax. As the subsidy only applies on clean output, the tax has to correct the
distortion caused by the externality and the contraction caused the …rm’s market power
on the dirty output. Thus, our …ndings support the idea that feed-in subsidies open the
possibility for improving the regulation of a polluting …rm with market power. On one
hand, they are a good alternative to taxation because they could yield a larger net social
welfare. On the other hand, the combination of an emission tax and a feed-in subsidy
induces the …rm to implement the e¢ cient outcome.
The analysis developed in this paper could be extended in di¤erent directions. Our
analysis has focused on the study of feed-in premiums, a policy that consists of setting
up a subsidy (a premium) on the output price to discriminate between dirty and clean
outputs. However, several countries in Europe instead have applied a feed-in tari¤ that
implies a direct regulation of the price for the clean output. Thus, it would be interesting
to extend the analysis to consider this alternative support scheme for the clean output.
On the other hand, as the research has been con…ned to the case of a polluting monopoly,
it would be also interesting to look at other market structures to check the robustness of
the results obtained in the paper. We expect that the combination of an emission tax and
a feed-in subsidy works for markets with imperfect competition as the results obtained
by Reichenbach and Requate (2012) for a polluting oligopoly with a clean competitive
fringe suggest. A …rst step in this direction could be to complete the analysis of the
market equilibrium developed by Fehr and Ropenus (2017) for a dominant …rm with a
competitive fringe calculating the optimal policy. Finally, the study of the e¤ects that
di¤erent policy instruments have on green innovation is also in the research agenda for
addressing in the future.
APPENDIX
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A. The sign of the di¤erence in pro…ts
Let’s suppose that the di¤erence is negative or zero
2 2

(pe + )((A
)p2e + 2 d)2
d
+
4(pe + d)2 pe
4pe (p2e + 2 (pe + d))2

0:

Then, it must satisfy that
)p2e + 2

(pe + )((A

2 2

d)2 (pe + d)2

d (p2e + 2 (pe + d))2 :

Developing both sides of the inequality, we obtain the following expression
dp
+p3

4d3 (A

2

4p3 (A

) + p3

2

) + 4d3 + dp2 (8A

+ Ap3 (A

2 ) + 2dp2 (A2

+p5 (d + p)2 (A
that is strictly positive for
that

t

is larger than

s

5 ) + 4Ad2 p
2

) + A2 d2 p + 2d2 p (3A

4 )

)2 > 0;

< A=2: Thus, we have a contradiction and we can conclude

:
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